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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the impact of labour mobility on employment, by extending the model of 
Hamermesh (1992). The difference between our model and the approach of Hamermesh is 
threefold. First, we distinguish inflow and outflow of employed workers, whereas Hamermesh 
only considers the outflow of employed workers. Second, we explicitiy include the possibility 
that firms may want to fire workers, which is not allowed by Hamermesh. Third, we distinguish 
the inflow of an employed and the inflow of an unemployed worker, moving from the pool of 
unemployed to a job. In this paper, we approximate job mobility by voluntary quits; hence, we 
abstract from quits into unemployment. 
We first summarize the role of job mobility in labour demand iiterature. In the survey of Nickell 
(1986), the theoretical labour demand equation contains voluntary quits, but they are supposed 
to be some constant fraction of employment. He also constructs an equation suitable for 
empirical work, which is obtained via a symmetrie quadratic adjustment costs function; 
voluntary quits, however, are completely left out from this analysis. 
Burgess (1988, 1992a,b) and Burgess and Doledo (1989) assume the parameter of the 
adjustment costs function to be time varying. Consequently, the speed of adjustment of 
employment is determined by some labour market variables. One of these variables is the 
number of voluntary quits, since they may facilitate the adjustment of employment to lts 
desired ievel. 
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) model the asymmetry of adjustment costs by distinguishing linear 
hiring and firing costs. According to their model, there exists a range, in which employment is 
not adjusted. The barriers of this range are determined by a number of variables, one of them 
is the quit rate. A calibration of the model showed that the negative impact of quits on the 
firing barrier is much larger than the positive impact of quits on the hiring banier. 
Hamermesh (1992) disentangles the adjustment costs into quadratic net and gross adjustment 
costs. Net adjustment costs are the costs due to a change in the Ievel of employment; gross 
adjustment costs are the costs of the inflow or outflow of employees. Hamermesh also 
proposes a labour demand equation, where the net and gross adjustment costs are fixed, ie. 
independent on the magnitude of the change in employment. His estimates with firm-level data 
indicate that quadratic net and gross adjustment costs also can be distinguished empirically; 
but Hamermesh does not succeed in finding empirical evidence for fixed net and gross 
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adjustment. 
Hamermesh and Pfann (1992) also distinguish net and gross adjustment costs, applying a 
functional form of an asymmetrie adjustment costs function proposed by Pfann and Palm 
(1992). Using manufacturing data of the U.S. for 1960-1981, they show that quits induce 
asymmetrie behaviour. Their interpretation of this result is that quits lead to costs, which are 
the costs of replacing employees. 
In this paper, we assume that the decision to move to another job is a worker initiated decision 
(cf. McLaughin, 1991). Thus, the employer has no influence on the number of quits of his 
employees. In our model quits may influence the level of employment directly. The line of 
reasoning is as follows. Inflow of an employed worker may be cheaper for a firm than inflow of 
an unemployed worker. Hence, in that case inflow of employed implies lower adjustment costs 
compared to unemployed. Labour mobility between firms may affect the total cost level of 
firms, which in its turn has impact on the level of employment. 
We distinguish the adjustment costs of firms in a firing regime (net decrease of employment) 
and firms in a hiring regime (net increase of employment). We follow BentoJila and Bertola 
(1990) by modelling an asymmetrie impact of adjustment costs on the level of employment in 
both regimes. For firms in a firing regime, lower adjustment costs imply that it is easier to 
destroy jobs, and hence have a negative impact on the level of employment. On the other 
hand, for firms in a hiring regime, iower adjustment costs facilitate the creation of jobs, and 
hence have a positive impact on the level of employment. Apparently, the description of the 
adjustment costs is crucial to understand the relationship between labour mobility and 
employment. 
Although our empirical analysis is at the macro-level, we explicitly construct the theoretical 
aggregate labour demand equation from the micro behaviour of firms. The reason for doing so 
is twofold. First, firms have heterogeneous employment fluctuations. See, e.g. Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1990), who show empirically that even in an economie downturn some firms may 
be in a hiring regime, whereas at the same time, the aggregate level of employment decreases. 
Second, job mobility concerns a change of employment of two firms; both firms experience an 
opposite change of employment. Therefore, we should distinguish between the firm from which 
an employee leaves, and the firm to which an employee goes. Furthermore, we want to derive 
the conditions under which job mobility has a positive impact on the level of employment. 
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The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical micro-model, whereas 
section 3 considers the macro-implications. Section 4 reports the estimation results and section 
5 concludes. 
2. THEORY 
2.1. Some intuition about adjustment costs and labour mobility 
This sub-section provides some intuitive notions about the impact of quits on the adjustment 
costs of employment, since we believe that labour mobility should be captured into the labour 
demand equation via the gross adjustment costs. We suppose labour to be homogeneous 
inside firms, but heterogeneous between firms. Note that in this case, we abstract from labour 
movement inside the firm. We concentrate on the role of quits on the adjustment costs for all 
firms together. We assume that the adjustment costs of employed workers may be lower than 
the adjustment costs of unemployed workers. 
For the sake of reasoning, we consider three cases. First, all firms are in a hiring regime. If the 
adjustment costs of the inflow of an unemployed worker are the same for all firms, then overall 
adjustment costs will not decrease by labour mobility between firms: labour mobility leads to 
another vacant job with the same turnover costs. If the adjustment costs of the inflow of an 
unemployed worker are different between firms, quits may decrease the adjustment costs of 
the firms, as a whole. A firm with high adjustment costs of unemployed workers prefers to hire 
employed workers, who have lower adjustment costs. Suppose this firm hires workers from 
other firms with low adjustment costs. Firms with low adjustment costs of unemployed workers 
are less inclined to hire an employed worker, because the difference between the adjustment 
costs of an employed and unemployed worker is smaller. In other words, these firms, who are 
also in a hiring regime, are more likely to hire unemployed workers. For all firms taken 
together, this may reduce adjustment costs, compared to the situation where adjustment costs 
of unemployed are the same for all firms. Thus, a quit between two firms in a hiring regime 
lowers the adjustment costs, only if the adjustment costs of the inflow of an unemployed 
worker between both firms are sufficiently different. The second case is trivial: if all firms are in 
a firing regime, there are no quits; there is no firm who wants to hire new workers. In the third 
case, some firms are in a hiring regime and other firms are in a firing regime. An employee 
moving from a firm in a firing regime to a firm in a hiring regime, lowers the adjustment costs. 
First, the quit lowers the adjustment costs of the firm in a firing regime (it does not have to fire 
the worker). Second, the quit lowers the adjustment costs of the firm in the hiring regime, since 
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the adjustment costs of the inflow an employed worker are lower than the adjustment costs of 
the inflow of an unemployed worker. 
2.2. Net and gross adjustment costs 
To formalize the intuition of the previous sub-section, we construct a micro-framework, 
describing the relationship between employment and quits. To determine the optimal employ-
ment path, firm i maximizes the expected discounted future profits 
max ^ 5£=0 ^8[n(Lj t+8I Zt j t+8, Zgj t + 8 ZR, t+8) - w,|t+8L,it+8 
{Lj
-
t+s}
 - l f= 1 pr)iZr>iit - 0.5C1)t+s], i=1 N, (1) 
where E^ is the expectations operator conditional on the information available at time t, <f> is a 
discount factor, n is a concave production function, L is the Ievel of employment, Z are other 
variables which influence the revenues, w is the real wage, pr is the real price of the r-th 
production factor, R + 1 is the number of production factors, N the number of firms, and C is an 
adjustment costs function. 
Following Hamermesh (1992), the functional form of the production function is 
*<k,VZU,v Z2,i,t ZR,i,t) = (?0 + W k t + J f t i <?, + ^r,t)Zr,i,t" <>^oM?t 
- 0 . 0 * , ^ + 2 * , r ^ ^ i , , , 1-1 N, (2) 
where f, f and V are positive parameters of the production function; £ is a serially uncorrelated 
error process, with zero mean and finite variance. 
We assume that the firm faces different adjustment costs under three regimes. In the first 
regime, the 'hiring regime', the firm only hires. In the second regime, the 'do-nothing regime', 
the firm neither hires nor fires. In the third regime, the 'firing regime', the firm only fires. 
Distinction between adjustment costs for different regimes has recently been applied by e.g. 
Nickell (1986), Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1992). The distinction implies that a 
firm does not hire and fire simultaneously. The adjustment costs functions of firm i for the three 
regimes are, respectively 
C,, - *o<kt " k t - / + " i j O * ! / + ^ i / 
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Ci,t - "od-U- H M ) 2 . * k t = kt-1 - FX% Ob) 
CM - "o(kt" k t - / + ^3(FXUi,t)2. 
» k t = kt-1 " FX \ t" FXqi.f (3c) 
F is the outflow or the inflow of employees; the superscripts iq and iu denote the inflow of 
employed and unemployed workers, respectively; the superscripts xq and xu denote the 
outflow to another job and the outflow into unemployment, respectively; u0, vx-x, vz and v3 are 
positive parameters. 
The adjustment costs are split up in net and gross adjustment costs. Net adjustment costs are 
measured by the costs of a change in the level of employment. Gross adjustment costs are the 
costs of inflow or outflow of employees. For an unemployed worker, the gross adjustment 
costs are •i/1 j . In our model, these costs differ between firms, since sub-section 2.1 suggested 
that only if the gross adjustment costs of the inflow of unemployed workers are different 
between firms, quits may decrease the adjustment costs. We supposed that the gross 
adjustment costs of an inflow of an unemployed worker are higher than the gross adjustment 
costs of the inflow of an employed worker, vA -{ > vz. Hence, the inflow of employed workers 
may be beneficial for a firm. Nevertheless, some firms, who are typically at the end of the 
vacancy chain (Akerlof et al., 1988) hire unemployed workers, either because employed 
workers are scarce, or because of a smali difference of the gross adjustment costs between 
employed and unemployed workers. 
For the inflow of one employed worker, the marginal gross adjustment costs are 2v2. The 
marginal firing costs are 2i/3. Note that in a firing regime no gross adjustment costs are 
connected to a voluntary outflow Fxq, since quits contribute to the reduction of employment, 
that a firm in a firing regime wants to attain. Only in a hiring regime, there is an inflow of 
employed workers. We realize that in a firing regime the number of quits may be larger than 
the planned decrease of the level employment, which leads, consequently, to hiring of 
employees. Since this case does not provide additional knowledge about job mobility, we 
assume that it does not take place. 
To solve aggregation problems, we have to make another simplifying assumption: net 
adjustment costs are the same for all regimes. Despite this assumption, our model (3) still 
refiects an asymmetrie relationship between outflow of quits and the adjustment costs, since in 
a hiring regime an outflow of employees may increase the adjustment costs. On the other 
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hand, in a firing regime an outflow of employees decreases the adjustment costs, as can 
readiiy be observed from (3c). 
In (3a), there exists a trade-off between the inflow of empioyed and unempioyed workers. To 
reach the desired employment level, an increase in the inflow of empioyed, Fiq, leads to a 
decrease in the inflow of unempioyed, Fu. According to (3), firms benefit from the inflow of 
empioyed workers, since the gross adjustment costs are lower. Thus, empioyed workers are 
preferred to unempioyed workers, although there are firms who hire unempioyed workers. This 
is in line with Lindeboom ef al. (1992), who show empirically that given a contact between a 
firm and an applicant, the probability of being accepted is higher for an empioyed worker than 
for an unempioyed; however, for the latter category, the probability is nonzero. 
Appendix A derives the labour demand equations for the three regimes. The constructed form 
does not contain Fiu. It is not possible to obtain a labour demand equation with all flows, since 
in that case, one would obtain the intertemporal identity equation of employment. The labour 
demand equation for a firm in a hiring regime is 
kt » "ikt-1 + WlAt" "«"At - V l A + sf-oVrJ.* (««) 
«% + *»* > O-
where a and 7 are parameters, and w » ZQ. The parameter T/J is equal to 
" i0 " Vft)"1(*Piq " 1 ) / ( l /0 + " I j ) ' 
where piq is the AR-parameter of the AR(1)-process, that we assume to generale quits; a, and 
/3j are the smallest and the largest root of the second order difference equation in Lj
 t (see 
appendix A); (1 - Qj) is called the speed of adjustment of employment. In (4a) the inflow of 
quits, F'q, has a twofold effect on employment. First, r/ji/1 s represents the indirect substitution 
effect of quits on employment. Recall that there exists a trade-off between Fiq and F"". 
According to this substitution effect, a higher inflow of empioyed workers implies a lower inflow 
of unempioyed workers. Because the gross adjustment costs of an empioyed worker are lower 
than those of an unempioyed worker, the firm has lower gross adjustment costs when hiring an 
empioyed worker and can hence reach a higher levei of employment. Second, r\yz represents 
the adjustment costs of the inflow of an empioyed worker. Higher adjustment costs have a 
negative impact on employment. Obviously, the outflow of quits, Fxq, has a negative effect on 
employment, since an outflow of workers to other firms leads to a reduction of the level of 
employment. 
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In the same way, it is possible to derive the labour demand equations for a firm in a do-nothing 
regime and a firing regime. These are, respectively 
kt = «okt-1 + ^oTrZr.i.f <*) 
k t = "i.t-1 - FXqi.t. 
and 
k t " Qikt-1 " ^3FXq i,t + SrR=07r,iZr,i,t. (*) 
FX\t > 0-
Equation (4c) shows that in a firing regime, higher firing costs, i/3, lead to a more negative 
impact of quits on employment. Thus, if firing costs are relative low, quits have less impact on 
employment than 'if firing costs are relative high. in the extreme case of absence of firing costs 
(i/3 = 0), a quit has no impact on employment, since the firm faces two options to destroy em-
ployment, voluntary quits or firing, which both have no gross adjustment costs. 
3. MACRO-IMPLICATIONS 
This section considers the implications of the micro-equations for labour demand at the macro-
level. To keep things simple, we first discuss two cases, in which one employee moves from 
one firm to another. In both cases, the employee moves to a firm in a hiring regime. The firm 
from which the employee quits, is in the first case also in a hiring regime (sub-section 3.1), but 
in the second case, it is in a firing regime (sub-section 3.2). Next, we construct the aggregate 
equation for all firms (sub-section 3.3). We do not explicitly discuss a quit from a firm in a do-
nothing regime, since, if we take vz = 0, then a quit from a firing firm and a do-nothing firm 
have the same implications. 
3.1. Labour mobility from a hiring firm to another hiring firm 
Suppose that both firm i and firm j want to hire one extra employee. We first investigate for 
which values of v^., i/1 • and v2, the marginal gross adjustment costs in case of absence of a 
quit between firm i and j are iarger than the marginal gross adjustment costs in case of a quit 
between firm i and j . Only then, can quits have a positive impact on the leve! employment. 
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Next, we compare this outcome with the coëfficiënt of quits in the aggregate employment 
equation. 
If there is no rnovement of an employee between firm i and j , then both firms hire an unem-
ployed worker. According to equation (3a), the marginal gross adjustment costs without a quit 
are 2f1 j + 2v1y In case of a quit from firm j to firm i, firm i hires the employed worker from 
firm j , and firm j hires two unemployed workers, since both firms want to expand employment 
with one person each. The marginal gross adjustment costs become 2v2 + 4 ^ . Quits have a 
positive impact on employment only if the marginal gross adjustment costs, in case of absence 
of a quit between both firms, are larger than the marginal gross adjustment costs in case of a 
quit between both firms. Hence, 
2*1,1 + 2"u > 2*2 + 4 j / i , j . 
or, 
" i j - " i j > v2- (5) 
Thus, if the marginal gross adjustment costs of hiring an unemployed worker are much lower 
(at least v2) for firm j than for firm i, then a quit will increase employment at the aggregate 
level. The inflow of unemployed takes place in those firms, which have relatively low marginal 
gross adjustment costs of the inflow of an unemployed person. Note that if both firm i and firm 
j have the same marginal gross adjustment costs of hiring an unemployed, then the LHS of (5) 
is zero. This implies that both firms loose from a quit between the firms, because it leads in 
total to higher marginal gross adjustment costs. This is the case, even if the marginal gross 
adjustment costs of a quit (2i/2) are relatively low. 
We will compare (5) with the coëfficiënt of quits in an aggregate labour demand equation. 
Concentrating on the inflow and outflow of workers, the labour demand equations of firm i and 
j are, essentialiy, 
kt = «VI At - ^ At - v i A + - w 
kt - «viA - v A - "i"iAt+ •- < 6 b > 
where the dots represent the exogenous variables, which we have omitted for convenience. 
Suppose there is one quit from firm j to firm i, hence F1^
 t = Fxqj t = 1 and Fxqj t = F1^ t = 0. 
The aggregate labour demand equation of both firms becomes 
9 
*-t = faivi,i - Wz - i j ^ i j)Qt + ••- 0) 
where Q = f*\ = Fxqt. Quits have a positive impact on the level of employment if 
" i j - ( V i ) " i j > " * ® 
The term r ? ^ can be interpreted as a scaling factor, which arises, because of firm-specific 
gross adjustment costs of the inflow of unempioyed workers. According to appendix A, 
V»?i= I("o + "l.lVO'o + "lj)][08| - /»lq)/09j - Piq)][(^j/^i)] 
« (a^ iV ta^^ l . i f ^ ^y^ i , (9) 
< l. if^j >•/,;. 
Recall that (1 - ctj) is the speed of adjustment of employment of firm i. From equations (A3) and 
(A4) in appendix A can be derived that i/1: < u:] implies a, > av This is also intuitive clear, 
since iarger gross adjustment costs of the inflow of unempioyed workers leads to a slower 
speed of adjustment of employment. Hence (8) can be written as 
where <5 is positive (when J/1 = < v1 j) and close to zero. Note that rjj is determined by 4>, V<0, v0 
and i/1;-, the exact relationship is very complex. In order to get insight into «5 we have simulated 
T7j/f7f for different values v^-t and t/1 j , using several reaiistic values of <t>, % and vQ, based on 
estimates of Sargent (1978), Meese (1980), Pfann (1989, page 53) and Hamermesh (1992). 6 is 
the upperbound with respect to the differences between i/1 s and i/1 =. These simulations give us 
information concerning the conditions for a positive impact of quits on labour demand, when 
the approach via the marginal adjustment costs (5) and the derivation via labour demand (8) 
are compared. The difference between (8) and (5) appears to be small. Appendix B reports the 
simulation results. For different values of i/1 j and i/1 =, the upper bounds of v2 that yield a 
positive influence of quits on employment are presented. It appears that the ratio r\Jr)x is 
slightly iarger than one, and varies only moderately. Moreover, a Iarger difference between ï/.,
 { 
and ï/^i induces a smaller ratio. Thus, according to the simulations of (8), v2 must be some 
smaller than the difference between v1 s and u^y the scaling factor rii/rii causes (8) to be a 
somewhat stronger restriction than (5). 
Equations (6a,b) also imply that if firm i and j hire one worker from each other, the aggregate 
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labour demand equation of both firms becomes 
L, - -0?i + «ïp«2Qi + .... 
Hence, quits have a negative impact on aggregate employment, if two firms exchange an 
employee. 
3.2. Labour mobility trom a firing firm to a hiring firm 
The second case concerns a quit from a firm in a firing regime to a firm in a hiring regime. 
Again, we first investigate the effect of a quit on the gross adjustment costs for both firms. 
Recall that a reduction of gross adjustment costs of employment nas a negative impact on 
employment for the firing firm, but a positive impact on employment for the hiring firm. 
Therefore, in order to obtain a positive relationship between aggregate employment and 
aggregate quits, the firm in the hiring regime shouid have relatively low gross adjustment costs, 
whereas the firm in the firing regime shouid have high gross adjustment costs. Hence, in this 
case, we may not compare the situation without quits with the situation with quits, such as in 
(5). Instead, we compare the reduction of the marginal gross adjustment costs for the firing 
firm with the reduction of the marginal gross adjustment costs for the hiring firm. If the former 
is smaller than the latter, quits have a positive impact on the aggregate level of employment. 
Suppose firm i hires an unemployed worker, with marginal gross adjustment costs 2»/.1 j , and 
firm j fires an employed worker, with marginal gross adjustment costs 2i/3. Quits have a 
positive impact on employment for both firms taken together, only if the decrease of the 
marginal gross adjustment costs of the hiring firm (2vu - 2v2) is larger than the decrease of 
the marginal gross adjustment costs, (2v3 - 0) (since no costs are connected to a quit), of the 
firing firm. Hence, 
"1,1 " v2 > VZ' (1°) 
Next, we will compare this result with the coëfficiënt of quits in the aggregate labour demand 
equation of both firms. The labour demand equation of firm i and j are respectively 
kt = ¥ A - wAt - w*f\+ ••• < 1 1 a > 
kt = - ^ F* V - < 1 1 b > 
Since, Fiqi t = Fxq: t = 1 and Fxq: t = 0, the aggregate equation of both firms becomes 
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L, = ( 7 7 ^ j - fjji/j, - J?jV3)Qt + .... (12) 
Quits have a positive impact on employment at the aggregate level, if 
or, 
uu - 1 / 2 > (1 + 6)«/3, (13) 
where 6 is small and positive (negative) if t/3 is smaller (larger) than i/ t j . Again the ratio r?j/r?| 
can be interpreted as a scaling factor due to firm-specific gross adjustment costs. Appendix B 
gives the upper bounds of v2, which yield a positive relationship in (12), for different values of 
i/1 j and i/3. Thus, also for a quit from a firing firm to a hiring firm, restriction (13), obtained via 
the aggregate labour demand equation, differs slightly from restriction (10), obtained via a 
comparision of the marginal gross adjustment costs. 
3.3. The aggregate equation 
In the two previous sub-sections, we have shown under which restrictions a quit between two 
firms leads to a positive impact on the level of employment. Job-to-job movement can be 
considered as an allocation process, which changes the adjustment costs overall. It is, 
however, possible that a quit between two firms is not an optimal allocation process, for 
instance, if vYl and ur. do not differ sufficiently for two firms in a hiring regime, and yet a quit 
takes place. To test whether quits lead to an optimal allocation process, one should use micro-
data, containing at least information concerning the source and the costs of the inflow of the 
employees. At the macro-level, one cannot validly test the relationship, since, as we have 
shown, it is not possible to specify the sign of the coëfficiënt of quits a priori. Therefore, the 
iabour demand equation at the macro-level becomes 
L, = XL,., + 2 ^ 0 7 ^ , + 7R+1Qt. (14) 
where coefficients are weighted sums of the coefficients of the individual labour demand 
equations. The sign of -yR+1 is indeterminate. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section we present the estimation results, using quarteriy manufacturing data of The 
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Netherlands from 1973:1 to 1990:IV. Since quits are an essential element in our theoretical 
model, they also play a substantial role in our empirical model. However, data of quits in The 
Netherlands are scarce. For the period investigated, two series are availabie. The first has been 
collected two yearly from 1975 to 1985. The second has been collected yeariy from 1983 to 
1990. Using the close resemblance of quits and the vacancy-unemployment ratio (see Burgess 
(1988) and Burgess and Doledo (1989)), we have constructed quit data for our analysis; see 
Appendix C. 
We use as variables Z the same variables as in Burgess (1992a,b). These are the real wage 
rate (w), the real capital stock (K), a measure of aggregate demand competitiveness (COMP), 
world trade shocks (WT), a measure of adjusted fiscal stance (AD) and an index of technical 
progress (TP). For a description of these variables, we refer to the data appendix C. 
First, we conduct a preliminary data analysis by applying the unit root test of Dickey and Fuller 
(1981), to assess stationarity of the variables involved. The test results, which are very much in 
line with Burgess (1992b), are presented in table 1. The results indicate that we shouid take the 
first difference of the variables involved. 
Notlce that the aggregate labour demand equation (14) that we derived is based on aggrega-
tion across firms with heterogeneous, firm-specific, labour, with different responses. Therefore, 
we specify a functional form with more lags on employment, the Z variables and the quit rate 
(Cf. Nickell, 1986 and Bresson et al. 1992). Thus, we start from a general autoregressive 
distributed lag model where all variables, except the quit rate are in logs. Cf. Hamermesh and 
Pfann (1992). Rewriting (14) in error-correction form we have 
A^ogtg = A» + M o g M + SrR=oTrrl°g(Zr,t-l) + TR+A-l) 
+ 5|=1rsA1log(Lt.8) + S f . ^ ^ r ^ l o g ^ ^ ) + ^ T R ^ O * . + 415) 
where n is the deterministic part, usually consisting of a constant and seasonal dummy 
variables and log(Z,) = (log(K,), log(wt), COMPt, WTt, ADt, TPt)', the latter four variables are 
already in logs; see appendix C. ct represents the uncorrelated white noise error process. A,<X 
= Xf - X,.k. The lags of the autoregressive variables are set to p=5 and the lags of the other 
explanatory variables to q=4. All the predetermined variables in (15) are lagged, in order to 
evade simultaneity bias of the estimates of the parameters. 
This model shouid then sequentially be simplified to a model specification that is still an 
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adequate representation of the data generating process (DGP) of employment in the Nether-
lands. In order to assess whether our models are still a valid representation of this DGP, we 
apply a number of misspecification tests. We use the Lagrange Multiplier test of Godfrey (1978) 
and the test of Ljung and Box (1978) on absence of residual autocorrelation. Furthermore, we 
apply the test of Jarque and Bera (1980) on non-normally distributed disturbances and the 
ARCH test of Engle (1982). As an additional test on heteroskedasticity, we apply the test 
developed by White (1980). We also apply the familiar RESET test on functional form and 
omitted variables, and the Chow test on predicted failure. 
As a first simplification of the general form (15), we test whether a number of variables with 
insignificant parameters can be deleted from the dynamic part. The null hypothesis of deleting 
A^og^j), (i=2,3,5) combining all lags of A^ogfK,) to A^ogO^) and deleting A1log(ww), 
A^OMPy, &fNTu (i=2,3,4) and deleting all lags of A ^ , A1ADt and A^P,, yields F(27,27) = 
0.738, which cannot be rejected at a 5 percent significance level. 
Second, we test for the presence of a significant cointegration relation. Instead of using the 
now Standard test of Engle and Granger (1987) or the Johansen (1988,1991) procedure of 
testing the f uil system, we use the approach set out in Boswijk (1991) and Boswijk and Franses 
(1992). It appears that tests on cointegration are sensitive to a correct specification of the 
dynamic part of the model. Underidentification of the lag structure of this part may lead to 
spurious cointegration too often, whereas overindentification leads to rejecting cointegration 
too often (cf. Boswijk and Franses, 1992). 
We therefore started with a general model specification and first simplified the dynamic part so 
that this simplified model is still consistent with the general model we started with. Application 
of the cointegration test yields £t = 30.51, which is significant at a 5% significance level; the 
5% critical value with seven explanatory variables is 27.27 (cf. Boswijk, 1991). Thus, the 
presence of a cointegration relation as included in (15) cannot be rejected. This result is 
confirmed by the Standard cointegration tests of Engle and Granger (1987), CRDW = 0.404 
and ADF(4) = -3.673, indicating a stationary error process of the static error correction 
equation of (15). 
Finally, we simplify the error-correction part of the model. Testing the validity of constant 
returns to scale and deleting all variables, except log(w) and Q, yields F(5,54) = 2.034. This 
cannot be rejected at 5% significance. The finally selected model is presented in table 2. Notice 
that the model slightly suffers from heteroskastic disturbances, as indicated by the test of White 
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(1980). This implies that the estimates might not be efficiënt. This problem can be avoided by 
using the heteroskedastcity-consistent covariance matrix estimator of White (1980), which still 
yieids efficiënt estimates asymptoticaily. Application implies that only the coëfficiënt of the real 
wage rate in the error-correction part becomes siightly insignificant at a 5 percent significance 
leve!; it is however, still significant at 10 percent. 
This model has the following implications. First, the long-run wage elasticity has a value of 
about -0.4 (cf. Hamermesh, 1986,1991), whereas the 'short-run' wage elasticity, derived from 
the dynamic part of the model, is about -0.15. The coefficients of A.,COMP and A1WT have the 
expected sign. The negative sign of the capital stock variable implies substitution between 
labour and capital. Finally, we turn to the effect of the quit rate. The coëfficiënt of the quit rate 
is positive, implying that an increase in the quit rate contributes to expanding employment. The 
long-run elasticity of quits with respect to log(L/K) is about 0.23. Hence, with respect to the 
labour-capital ratio, this means an elasticity of about 1.26. In order to get an impression of the 
actual number of workers this amounts to, we estimated the same model as in table 2, but 
instead of log (L/K), we only took log(L) in the error-correction part. It implies that a one 
percentage point increase in the quit rate yieids an increase in employment of around one 
thousand persons. At first sight this appears to be only of minor importance. However, 
considering the relative large fluctuations in the quit rate in the Netherlands, ranging from 15% 
in 1975 to 6% in 1983, to again 15% in 1990 (see table 1), its effect can in fact be quite 
substantial. 
In the theory of section 2, we have introduced the possibility of a different effect of quits on 
employment, depending on the assumption of whether the firm is in a hiring regime or in a 
firing regime. However, the estimates of table 2 imply a constant impact. We will next try to 
relax this assumption by introducing a tentative index of the number of firms in a hiring and 
firing regime. We take the number of fires Ft to be equal to the total number of persons for 
whom an application of dismissal was granted by the Public Employment Agencies in the 
Netherlands. The hires are constructed as H,= AL, + Ft.1 Under the simpIHying assumption 
that the number of quits is independent of the regime of employment, the total mobility from 
firms in a firing regime to firms in a hiring regime is approximated by 
Qft - Qt*Ft/(Ft + Ht), 
Since fires are connected to all employees, we now take 1^ to be total employment in the 
business sector. 
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and mobility f ram firms in a hiring regime to other firms in a hiring regime is approximated by 
Qh, = Qt*Ht/(Ft + H,). 
Reliable data on hires and fires are available from 1978:11 onwards. So before 1978:11, we take 
the aggregate quit rate as in our previous model, whereas from 1978:11 to 1990:1 V we distin-
guish quits in both regimes, /.e., Qh and Qf. This approach yields the model presented in tabie 
3. This model does not appear to be severely misspecified. Apart from the RESET(3) test, none 
of the other misspecification tests points towards an invalid specification. Hence, for the time 
being, we assert that this model is reasonably adequate. 
The estimation results of this extended model imply that the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are of a similar magnitude as those of the model in the table 2. However, the 
distinction we make between quits in a hiring and in a firing regime, seems to suggest that only 
quits in a hiring regime have a significant impact on employment, whereas the influence of 
quits in a firing regime appears to be insignificant. A Wald test on the equality of the coeffi-
cients of Qh and Qf yields x20)=7.52, which indicates that this hypothesis cannot be 
accepted. The long-run elasticity of Qh with respect to log(L/K) equals 0.32 and that of Qf is 
0.03. This means that a percentage point increase in the quit rate, when the rnajority of firms is 
a hiring regime implies an increase in employment of more than 2000 persons, whereas in the 
other regime this effect is negligible. 
Turning back to the theory of sections 2 and 3, we can draw the following tentative and 
cautious conclusions from our empirical results. First, quits appear to have a significant impact 
on employment. Second, in distinguishing hiring and firing regimes, it appears that the impact 
of quits on employment is sign'rficantly different between those regimes. This suggests that 
there is considerable heterogeneity between firms, which is also implied by our theory. As to 
the coefficients of Qh and Qf, which are linked to the coefficients of equation (7) and (12), 
respectively, we can merely state that the fact that the coëfficiënt of Qf is about zero implies 
that there might be relatively high costs involved in firing a person, /.e., i/3 might be rather high 
in (12). 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have shown under which conditions job mobility between two firms nas a 
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positive impact on the aggregate leve! of employment. We have derived and simulated the 
upper bound of the marginal hiring costs of an employed worker, for which a quit has a 
positive impact on aggregate employment. 
It appears that a quit from a firm in a hiring regime to another firm in a hiring regime has a 
positive effect on aggregate employment if the difference of the marginal adjustment costs of 
hiring an unemployed worker between both firms is somewhat larger than the marginal hiring 
costs of an employed worker. On the other hand, a quit from a firm in a firing regime to a firm 
in a hiring regime has a positive impact on employment if the quit leads to a somewhat larger 
reduction of the marginal gross adjustment costs for the firm in the hiring regime, than for the 
firm in the firing regime. 
It can be concluded that we cannot establish the sign of quits in the aggregate employment 
equation a priori. This is because mobility between two hiring firms is not necessarily beneficial 
for both firms as a whole. Therefore, the relationship should ideally be tested with micro-data, 
containing at least information on the source and the costs of the inflow of employees. Since 
we do not have access to these micro-data, we have estimated the relationship with macro-
data for the Netherlands. It appears that quits have a substantial positive impact on employ-
ment. Moreover, if we make an effort to distinguish quits in a hiring regime and quits in a firing 
regime in our empirical model, we find that indeed the impact of quits differs between those 
regimes. This implies substantial heterogeneity between firms conceming the relationship 
between quits and employment. 
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Table 1 - Unit root test results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
Name ADF{k)a) k Suggested l(d) 
m 
log(L) -0.311 10 
log(K) -2.482 5 
log(L/K) -1.092 5 
log(w) -3.869 3 
COMP -1.861 10 
WT -3.713 2 
AD -0.037 10 
TP -1.233 10 
Q -1.594 4 
a) Based on AZj = a + bt + cZ^ + 2^=1 AZ^ + ct, where t(6) is the t-value of 6. 
b) Strictly speaking the hypothesis of a unit root in w and WT is rejected at 5%, but not at 1%. 
However, in our error-correction-form (16) we do take A^ogM and A1WT in the short-run 
dynamic part. 
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Tabie 2 - Estimation results. 
Dependen! variable: AlogL, Sample period: 1973:1-1990:lV 
Independent 
variables 
CONST 0.0027 (3.310), 
log(L/K)t., -0.0046 (3.799) 
lOQ(\Nt.J -0.0017 (2.027) 
Qt-i 0.0011 (3.894)* 
^logL,., 1.1467 (36.26)* 
A^ogL^ -0.2775 (7-238)* 
A^ogfK,.,) -0.0187 (4.730), 
Ai'ogCw^) -0.0196 (2.827), 
A^OMPj. , 0.0039 (2.141) 
V>rTM 0.0193 (4.757) 
S.E. 0.000676 
R2 0.985 
T 72 
Xnorrm2' 2.577 
FAR(1-58) 0 
FAR(5.54) 0.019 
LB(12) 13.67 
FARCH(5 '67) 1.066 
FRESET(1 '58) 0.848 
FRESET(3-56) 1.575 
FChow(16,43) 1.351 
FChow(8.51) 0.864 
^2(19,53) 1.825* 
* Statistically significant from zero at the 5% level. 
Seasonal dummies are not presented. The t-values are in brackets by the estimated parameter 
values, SE is the residual Standard error of the equation, R2 is the correlation coëfficiënt and T 
is the number of observations used to estimate and test the model, x^ orm 's t n e normaiity test 
of Jarque and Bera (1980). F^ is Godfrey's test on residual autocorrelation (Godfrey, 1978). 
LB is the Ljung-Box test on residual autocorrelation. FmCH is Engle's ARCH test on 
heteroscedasticity (Engle, 1982). FRESET is the RESET-test. FChow is the Chow test on 
predictive failure and FXi2 is White's (1980) test on heteroskedasticity, based on actual and 
squared regressors. 
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Table 3 - Estimation results. 
Dependent variable: AlogL, Sample period: 1973:1-1990:!V 
Independent 
variables 
CONST 0.0030 (3.702), 
log(L/K)M -0.0057 (4.352), 
lo9(wt-i) .. -0.0023 (2.733) 
Q(73.1-1978.1 ) t1a) 0.0009 (3.158); 
0.0016 (4.767) 
0.0002 (0.427), 
AilogL,.-, 1.0689 (25.86) 
A^ogL,^ -0.3043 (7.761); 
A^ogfK,.,) -0.0218 (5.519) 
A i l o g ^ ) -0.0124 (1.659) 
A1COMPt ., 0.0031 (1.707) 
Aiwr„ 0.0153 (3.642) 
S.E. 0.000733 
R2 0.987 
T 72 
Xnorrm2) 5.502 
FARO.56) 0.031 
FAR(5.52) 0.420 
F ARCH( 5 - 6 7 ) 0.512 
FRESET(1 -5 6 ) 1.697 
FRESET(3.54) 4.390* 
FChow06,41) 1.154 
FChow(8.49) 1.114 
FXi2(23,49) 1.422 
* Statistically significant from zero at the 5% level. 
a) The variable is equal to Q for the period 1973:1-1978:1, and equal to zero elsewhere. 
b) The variables are equal to Qh and Qf for the period 1978:11-1990:IV, and equal to zero else-
where. 
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Appendix A - Micro iabour demand equations 
For its employment decision, the maximization problem of firm I in a hiring regime is 
ma* ^ ^=0 An(Lj i t +81 2 1 i l i t + r Zgi t + 8 ZRJ.US) - w i i t+sL i i t+8 
" ST=1 Pr,iZr,i,t+8 " 0^[«/00i,t+. " k t + 8 - / + ^\t+f + 
+ " a ^ H s ) 2 ] } - (A1) 
Using the definition of n in (2), this is equal to 
max E, S^= 0 * • {{?„ + e0,i,t+s)Li,t+s + SR.1 (?r + f r.t+i)Zr,l,t+i 
{Li,t+8} 
- 0-5V-0M!t+s " °-52rR= 1 f rZut+t + 4 1 1 f r k t + A . l . u . " Wtf+skt+s 
" 2 f t l Pr.iZr.i.t+s " °-5["o(kt+8 " k u s - / + "l.iO-i.t+s' "-i.t+s-1 
" I % + . + F^iit+S)2 + »2(ï\t+f)}. (A2) 
The Euler-equations of (A2) are 
^Et+tkt+t+1 " I V ^ o + "ij) + 1 + flkt+s + Li.t+s-1 = 
("0 + "1.|)"1H?0 + *0.t+t> + wi,t+8 -2f-1 frZrJ.t+s + 
+ (yu - •/a)WEt+.Fk«lit+.+1 - F*^ . ) - ^1>i(^Et+8Fxt' i j t+s+1 - Fx \ t +8)], 
8 = 0,1,2 (A3) 
where the transversality condition is 
lim ^ ,E tL t+, = 0. 
S-KO 
We follow Sargent (1978) and Hamermesh (1992) by modelling forward looking expectations. 
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The solutions of the Euler equations, after factorisation, are 
kt = «ikt-1 "V^O + " 1 . K - 0 ft*H?0 + £0,t+.) + wi,t+s-SrR-1 frZr,i,t+8 
+ 0/, j - i t f ( # E , + t ! % + t + 1 - f * W " " i , i ( ^ + 8 F X q i . t + 8 + l - Fxqi,t+s)]. 
(A4) 
where 0 < at < 1 < #"1 < pv Note that the roots of the second order difference equation (A3), 
cij and j8j are nonlinear functions of <f>, T/>0, V0 and v^x. We assume £0 i t, Fxqit, F*^, w i t and 
Z r i t , r=1,...,R, to follow an AR(1)-process, with AR parameters p5, pxq, piq, pw and p^r, 
r=1 R, respectively. The labour demand equation becomes 
l ^ = a, l1 i M - a,/<"o + «'ijïI-foO " W " €0.t0 - PE/)9i)"1 + W,it(1 - pj^ï' 
• # 1 f rZi.rO - Pz,M'' + <^1,i " "a)0 - Piq/Z^CMq " 1 ) 1 % 
- " i j O - P x q / ^ W P x q - 1 ) ^ - (A5) 
We define w • Zg, and suppose pjq « pxq. (A5) becomes in obvious notation 
k t = «ikt-1 + «^ i A t - *»l" A t - Wlf*\x + SrR=07r,iZr,i,t. (A6) 
F iqit + F i U i t >0 , 
1 , 1 l , L 
where v, - a,(1 - Piq//Öj)-1(^piq -1)/(«/0 + i/1fl). 
In the same way, the labour demand in the do-nothing regime and the firing regime can be 
derived. 
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Appendix B - Simulations 
This appendix provides the simuiation results of the upper bound of v2, for which 
v2 < " i j • 0 + «)"ij- (B1) 
For these values, there exists a positive coëfficiënt of quits in the aggregate employment 
equation, of two firms in a hiring regime. The ratio T)\/V\ in (B1) is very complex. It is equal to 
I("o + »iMvo + "ijWKA" i^c,)/CSj - PiqJlKo^, /^ ] , 
where«j and pt are nonlinearfunctions of <f>, i>0, u0and v^-r 
Table B1 up to B5 show the upper bounds of v2 for different values of vti and i/1 j , given 0, %, 
p and vQ. We can conclude from these tables that ^ / ^ is slightly larger than one, because v2 
is somewhat smaller than the difference between i/1 { and v^-.. Moreover, if the difference 
between t/ t : and i/1 j becomes larger, then rj/rji becomes closerto one. 
For a quit from a firing firm to a hiring firm, we have to find the upper bound of v2, for which 
vz < i/, j - (1 + ö)v3. (B2) 
After substituting v3 for i/1 j in (B2), one can use the simulations of (B1) to obtain the upper 
bound of v2 in (B2). 
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Table B1 - Values of vz for different i/1 s and i/1 j . 
Other parameters: <j> = 0.95, VQ = 1 ° . P= O-25. v o = ^-
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 
50 0.0 
45 2.7 0.0 
40 5.8 2.9 0.0 
35 9.2 6.1 3.0 0.0 
30 13.0 9.7 6.5 3.2 0.0 
25 17.3 13.8 10.3 6.9 3.4 0.0 
20 22.1 18.4 14.7 11.0 7.3 3.6 0.0 
15 27.6 23.6 19.7 15.7 11.8 7.8 3.9 0.0 
10 33.9 26.6 25.4 21.2 16.9 12.7 8.4 4.2 0.0 
5 41.3 36.7 32.1 27.5 22.9 18.3 13.7 9.1 4.5 0.0 
0 50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
Table B2 - Values of v2 for different i/1 -x and v^-y 
Other parameters: <j> = 0.95, if>0 = 1.0, p= 0.25, i/0 = 25. 
vn 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 
"u 
50 0.0 
45 2.1 0.0 
40 4.3 2.1 0.0 
35 7.0 4.6 2.3 0.0 
30 10.0 7.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 
25 13.7 10.9 8.2 5.4 2.7 0.0 
20 18.0 15.0 12.0 9.0 5.9 2.9 0.0 
15 23.3 20.0 16.6 13.3 9.9 6.6 3.3 0.0 
10 29.9 26.2 22.4 18.7 14.9 11.2 7.4 3.7 0.0 
5 38.5 34.2 29.9 25.6 21.3 17.0 12.8 8.5 4.2 0.0 
0 50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
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Table 63 - Values of J/2 for different J/1 s and i/1,. 
Other parameters: tf = 0.9Ö, ^o = 1 - ° . P- 0.25, »/0 = 50. 
" IJ 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 
" IJ 
50 0.0 
45 2.7 0.0 
40 5.8 2.9 0.0 
35 9.2 6.1 3.0 0.0 
30 13.0 9.7 6.5 3.2 0.0 
25 17.2 13.8 10.3 6.9 3.4 0.0 
20 22.0 18.3 14.7 11.0 7.3 3.6 0.0 
15 27.5 23.6 19.6 15.7 11.8 7.8 3.9 0.0 
10 33.9 29.6 25.4 21.1 16.9 12.7 8.4 4.2 0.0 
5 41.2 36.6 32.1 27.5 22.9 18.3 13.7 9.1 4.5 0.0 
0 50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
Table B4 - Values of i/p for different v<: and 1
 "1J-
= 2.0, Other parameters: 4> - 0.95, V>o p= 0.25 . »o = 50. 
JA ij 5 0 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 
50 0.0 
45 2.8 0.0 
40 5.9 2.9 0.0 
35 9.4 6.2 3.1 0.0 
30 13.2 9.9 6.6 3.5 0.0 
25 17.5 14.0 10.5 7.4 3.5 0.0 
20 22.4 18.6 14.9 11.1 7.4 3.7 0.0 
15 27.8 23.9 19.9 15.9 11.9 7.9 3.9 0.0 
10 34.1 29.8 25.6 21.3 17.0 12.8 8.5 4.2 0.0 
5 41.4 36.8 32.2 27.6 23.0 18.4 13.8 9.2 4.6 0.0 
0 50.0 45.0 40.0 35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
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Table B5 - Values of vz for different i/1, and t/1 <. 
Other parameters: ^ = 0.95, i>0 = 1.0, p= 0.90, uQ = 50. 
i /^ 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 
50 0.0 
45 3.2 0.0 
40 6.6 3.3 0.0 
35 10.4 6.9 3.4 
30 14.4 10.8 7.2 
25 18.9 15.1 11.3 
20 23.8 19.8 15.8 
15 29.2 25.0 20.8 
10 35.3 30.9 26.4 
5 42.2 37.5 32.8 
0 50.0 45.0 40.0 
0.0 
3.6 0.0 
7.5 3.7 0.0 
11.8 7.9 3.9 0.0 
16.7 12.5 8.3 4.1 0.0 
22.0 17.6 13.2 8.8 4.4 0.0 
28.1 23.4 18.7 14.0 9.3 4.6 0.0 
35.0 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
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Appendix C - Data sources, definitions and abbreviations 
Abbreviations 
CBS Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics 
CPB Netherlands Central Planning Bureau 
OECD Organization of Economie Cooperation and Development 
UN United Nations 
MEI Main Economie Indicators 
MBS Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 
NA National Accounts 
All variables are based on those used by Layard and Nickeil (1986) and Burgess (1992). 
Interpolation is done by means of a third order poiynomial function, uniess mentioned 
otherwise. 
L: Paid employment in the industrial sector in thousand man years, interpolated. Burgess 
(1992) and Hamermesh (1992) take the actual number of employed as a measure of 
labour demand. Unfortunately, for the Netherlands this series is only available since 
1978. Because we study data of the industrial sector, and part-time jobs are rare in 
industries, our measure of employment in labour years seems to be a good proxy for 
the actual number of employed (CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek 1990). 
Source: L, CBS, NA 1969-1984 and various issues, table D12. 
K: Real value of the capital stock of the industrial sector, interpolated. The nominal capital 
stock CS is calculated as 
CSt = CSj., - D M + \t.v (A1) 
where D is the depreciation and I is the investment of the industrial sector. To yieid K, 
CS is deflated by the real price of capital, defined by deflating the price index of invest-
ment goods (Pinv) by the producers price index of finished products (Py). 
Source: CS, CBS, Kapitaalgoederenvoorraad 1989, 1990, 1991. Other values calcu-
lated recursively using (A1); 
D, CBS, NA 1969-1984 and various issues, table D10; 
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I, CBS, NA 1969-1984 and various issues, table D14; 
Pinv, OECD, MEI (1980=100); 
Py, OECD, MEI (1980=100). 
w: the real wage costs, interpoiated. It is defined as 
W = Wi[(1 -WT/44.2)*1.3 + WT/44.2], 
deflated by Py, where Wl is the wage rate in the industrial sector, WT is average 
working time. W takes account of the reduction in working time and allows for an 
overtime premium of 30%. 
Source: Wl, CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek, various issues; 
WT, CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek, various issues. 
COMP: measure of domestic competiveness. COMP is calculated as 
COMP - log(e*P7Py), 
where e*P* is the unit value index of worid manufacturing exports converted from US 
dollars to Dutch guilders relative to the output price index P • e is the spot exchange 
rate from US dollars to Dutch guilders. 
Source: P*, UN, MBS, various issues, special table C or E; 
e, OECD, MEI. 
WT: worid trade measure. WT is defined as the residuals of the following regression 
log(QW)t = 3.934 + 0.0234t - 0.000312 + 2.4E-06T3 + seasonals. 
(224.1) (14.17) (-6.631) (6.561) 
QW is the quantity index of exports of all commodities from worid economies. 
Source: QW, UN, MBS, various issues, special tables C or E. 
AD: adjusted fiscal deficit, interpoiated. AD is defined as in Nickell (1986) 
AD = GOVDEF/POTGDP - 0.39*[(ICOST GOVDBT/POTGDP) 
- 0.02*(GOVDEBT/POTGDP)], 
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where GOVDEF is the government deficit, (ICOST)GOVDBT is the (interest payment of) 
government debts and POTGDP is the potential GDP, which we define as 
POTGDP - GDP/CAPUT, 
where GDP is the actual GDP and CAPUT is the capacity utilization rate. 
Source: GOVDEF, CBS, NA, table R5; 
GOVDEBT, CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek, various issues; 
(ICOST)GOVDEBT, CBS, Statistisch Jaarboek, various issues; 
GDP, CBS, NA 1969-1984 and various issues, table M3; 
CAPUT, OECD, MEI, various issues. 
measure of labour augmenting technical progress, interpolated. TP is computed via 
AlogAj = [AlogYt - i/LAlogLj - (1 - i/L)AlogK,]/i/L, 
where Yt is the GDP of the industrial sector and vL is the labour income share. The 
initial value of logA is set equal to zero. TP = logA, smoothed by doublé exponential 
smoothing. 
Source: Y, CBS, NA, table M3; 
uL, CPB, Lange Reeksen. 
quit rate, defined as the number of job-movers per 100 workers. This series is 
composed of the labour mobility measure, as coilected by the CBS, Arbeidskrachten-
telling, for 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983 and 1985, where the intermediate values were 
obtained by interpolation, the number of job-movers per 100 workers, as coilected by 
the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment in Kwartaalbericht Arbeidsmarkt 
for 1992, for the years 1983 to 1990. This series serves as the basis for the quit rate 
that we apply. The years 1972, 1973 and 1974 of Q are determined by means of the 
vacancy-unemployment (V-U) ratio, which is assumed to resemble the quit rate quite 
well. In table 3, we present the building blocks that we used to create Q. Quarteriy 
figures of Q are obtained by dividing by 4 and replicating the observations for each 
quarter in each consecutive year. See table 4. 
number of persons for which an application of dismissal was granted by the Public 
Employment Affairs in the Netherlands, interpolated. 
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Source: F, unpublished series, Ministry of Social Affairs & Empioyment. 
V-U: vacancy unemployment ratio, where V is the number of job vacancies in thousand 
units, and U is the seasonally adjusted unemployment in 1000 persons. 
Source: V, OECD, MEI; 
U, OECD, MEI. 
Table 4 - Job-to-job mobility (%) in the Netherlands, 1972 -1990. 
Year Q1*> Q2b) V-Uc) Qd) 
1972 0.586 15.0 
1973 0.610 15.2 
1974 0.514 14.5 
1975 8.1 0.242 13.0 
1976 0.169 12.3 
1977 7.3 0.203 11.7 
1978 0.231 11.7 
1979 7.2 0.242 11.5 
1980 0.172 11.0 
1981 6.6 0.045 10.6 
1982 0.018 8.3 
1983 3.7 0.012 5.9 
1984 0.019 7.0 
1985 5.0 8 0.032 8.0 
1986 9 0.038 9.0 
1987 12 0.039 12.0 
1988 14 0.042 14.0 
1989 14 0.058 14.0 
1990 15 0.078 15.0 
a) Source: Arbeidskrachtentelling, CBS. 
b) Source: Ministry of Social Affairs & Empioyment, Kwartaalbericht Arbeidsmarkt, 199211. 
c) The mean of the V-U ratio over the four quarters is presented. 
d) Quit rate based on Q2, where the values of 1972 to 1974 are constructed with help of V-U. 
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